The Power to Block the Affordable Care Act: What Are the Limits? by Kraemer, John D. & Gostin, Lawrence O.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2012 
The Power to Block the Affordable Care Act: What Are the Limits? 
John D. Kraemer 
Georgetown University Law Center, jdk32@law.georgetown.edu 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-190 
 
 




John D. Kraemer, Lawrence O. Gostin, The Power to Block the Affordable Care Act: What Are the 
Limits?, JAMA Online (November 21, 2012), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleid=1387811 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, and the 
Insurance Law Commons 
VIEWPOINT
ONLINE FIRST
The Power to Block the Affordable Care Act
What Are the Limits?
John D. Kraemer, JD, MPH
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
HEALTH CARE REFORM REMAINS PRECARIOUS IN THEUnited States, with intense political disagree-ment about the Affordable Care Act (ACA).Former Governor Romney vows to “repeal and
replace” President Obama’s signature domestic achieve-
ment.1 Although repeal would face potentially insur-
mountable political barriers,2 a Republican president could
selectively enforce the ACA, effectively blocking full
implementation. The president has wide discretion in
implementing legislation, so understanding the scope of
executive powers is important—not only for the ACA but
also for a broad range of social welfare legislation.
ACA Waivers
The Republican health care plan states, “On his first day in
office, Mitt Romney will issue an executive order . . . to is-
sue Obamacare waivers to all fifty states,”1 which appears
to envisage authorizing states to waive all, or major parts,
of the ACA. The Constitution, however, requires the presi-
dent to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”mean-
ing that he lacks the power “to refuse to execute laws passed
byCongresswithwhichhedisagrees,”unlessCongress grants
that discretion.3 Because the ACA provides no such blan-
ket waiver authority, granting states authority to disregard
the ACA’s key provisionswould likely violate the “take care”
clause.
The ACA does envision that certain provisions could be
waived, permitting innovative state approaches to better ful-
fill the act’s mission. The secretaries of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Treasury, for
example, could waive provisions—including the indi-
vidual mandate—if a state can show it would increase cov-
erage and reduce cost without raising the federal deficit.4
States, however,must specifically request suchwaivers,which
would not become available before 2017. President Obama
has sought an ACA amendment to make innovation waiv-
ers available by 2014. Similarly, the ACA retains Medicaid
waiver authority, which grants DHHS flexibility to permit
state alterations toMedicaid.4 These limited waiver authori-
ties, in principle, are intended to enhance, not undermine,
the ACA’s goals of increased access and lower cost.
Federal Health Insurance Exchanges
Executive agencies have considerable discretion to imple-
ment ACA provisions that are ambiguous. One area of am-
biguity is in the operation of federal health insurance ex-
changes. The ACA authorizes states to establish their own
exchanges, but the federal government is empowered to cre-
ate them if states decline. Several governors have opposed
creating exchanges or taken no steps to create them. The
law also offers premium subsidies for people whose house-
hold income is below 4 times the federal poverty level if they
buy insurance from the exchanges. The ACA directs the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) to grant subsides as a tax credit.
Due to an apparent oversight, the ACA only explicitly of-
fers subsidies in state-operated exchanges, but the IRS has
issued regulations to extend subsidies to federal ex-
changes.5
The courts defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations
in the face of statutory ambiguity. The courts would likely
uphold the Obama administration’s approach given evi-
dence that Congress intended the subsidies to extend to
federally operated exchanges. A Romney administration,
however, could alter the regulations, refusing to extend
subsidies to federal exchanges. Given the ACA’s plain lan-
guage, the courts could uphold such a Romney rule, unless
they concluded that the change was motivated by purely
political reasons and therefore arbitrary. Notably, “an
agency interpretation . . . which conflicts with the agency’s
earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less defer-
ence.”6
The Individual Mandate
The individual mandate operates as a tax, with the IRS
chargedwith collecting the funds. A President Romney could
instruct the IRS not tomake collection of this tax a priority—
potentially signaling that individuals will not be penalized
for failing to purchase qualifying insurance. He could, for
example, effectively fail to collect the tax from individuals
with high-deductible insurance—a long-favored Republi-
can option. If this had the effect of nullifying a key ACA pro-
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vision, the courts might view it as unconstitutional, but the
result is unclear. Notably, when Obama instructed federal
law enforcement officials to deprioritize the deportation of
nonviolent undocumented immigrants, he relied on the tra-
ditional executive discretion to enforce the law. Romney, if
elected, could claim a similar level of discretion.
Incomplete Funding of the ACA
Beyond presidential discretion to enforce the law, Con-
gress could fail to fully fund ACA implementation. This ap-
proach would not require repealing the ACA so it is more
politically palatable. Congressional scope to starve the ACA
of funds would be limited in relation to several key provi-
sions. For example, Congress directly funded high-risk pools
for individuals with preexisting conditions, health insur-
ance exchanges, the Independent Payment Advisory Board,
as well as the Community Health Center Fund and the Pre-
vention and Public Health Trust Fund. To withdraw this
funding, Congress would have to act through legislation,
which would be difficult in the current political environ-
ment.
Congress, however, did not directly fund the expansion
of the health workforce (including loan repayment), qual-
ity improvement, reduction of health disparities, and cer-
tain preventionprograms.7 This discretionary funding ismore
susceptible to defunding because it can be accomplished
through congressional inaction. Thus, even if President
Obama is reelected, unlessCongress acts affirmatively to fund
important parts of the ACA, health care reform will remain
incomplete.
Repeal and Replace
The approachmost often proposed by opponents of the ACA
is “repeal and replace.”Although the details are unclear, this
approach would require congressional legislation to alter or
eliminate substantial parts of the ACA. The most likely tar-
gets would be the individual mandate, federal conditions
on Medicaid payments to states, and the Independent Pay-
ment Advisory Board. Popular provisions, such as barring
preexisting condition exclusions, might be retained, though
perhaps in a less vigorous form.1 If not done carefully, piece-
meal replacement could result in a substantially worse prod-
uct. For example, by keeping preexisting condition cover-
age while eliminating the mandate, the cost of insurance
might soar.
“Repealing and replacing” the ACA is unlikely, requir-
ing Obama to lose the presidency and Republicans to hold
the House and 60 Senate seats to prevent a filibuster. An
alternative approach, through the budget reconciliation pro-
cess, cannot be filibustered. However, the budget reconcili-
ation process would face fierce Democratic challenges un-
der the “Byrd Rule,” which requires the Senate
parliamentarian to determine whether all aspects of the law
have direct—not merely incidental—effects on federal rev-
enue or spending.2
The ACA has considerable content beyond cost, such as
defined benefits, public health, and higher-quality ser-
vices. Moreover, the fiscal effect appears positive, with the
Congressional BudgetOffice scoring the ACA as saving $109
billion. Nor could Republicans use reconciliation to ad-
vance a social agenda, such as banning abortion funding,
because of previous rulings that the budget effect is inci-
dental.
Continuingon thePathway toFundamentalReform
Repeal of the ACAor blanket state waivers are unlikely given
the political and constitutional landscape. Still, if a Presi-
dent Romney or a Republican-controlled Congress re-
mained determined to do so, there would be ample oppor-
tunity to slow or block full ACA implementation. The future
of health care reform hinges on the November 6 election.
The public has a clear choice—either continue on the path-
way toward full health reformor scale back and adoptmarket-
based solutions. What is at stake is a fundamental vision of
how to ensure near-universal access to quality care at an af-
fordable cost.
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